The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is gradually transforming itself

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is gradually transforming itself into a full-blooded military set-up.

A key factor here has been the decision taken just now at the organization's Moscow summit to set up a collective rapid-response force to help bloc members to repulse aggression or in an emergency.

The strengthening of the CSTO has been one of Russia's main foreign policy successes in recent years. The process was a long and difficult one: the treaty, signed in 1992 following the collapse of the Soviet Union, remained on paper for a long time.

It was not until 2000, when Russia began regaining its influence in Central Asia, that the treaty took on a life of its own. In 2002, an organization with a permanent structure was set up on the basis of the treaty. This was a time when Russia and the United States vied for a leading role in Central Asia, where the U.S. set up its bases after 2001 to supply NATO's troops in Afghanistan.

The rivalry ended with the U.S. pulling out of most Central Asian republics where it originally deployed its forces. The government of Kyrgyzstan has recently decided to scrap its agreement with the U.S. on the Manas Air Base. This step will make the Americans seek new supply routes for their troops in Afghanistan.

Current events show a strong desire on the part of CSTO member-countries and above all Russia to pursue an independent policy in this area, keeping third countries out. A collective rapid-response force will give the CSTO a quick tool, leaving no time for third parties to intervene.

The make-up of the force is not yet defined. Russia was expected to make the largest contribution - an airborne division and an assault landing brigade. Some sources say these are units deployed in Ivanovo and Ulyanovsk, that is to say, the 98th Guards Svir Airborne Division (Ivanovo) and the 31st Guards Independent Order of Kutuzov 2nd Class Assault Landing Brigade (Ulyanovsk). Kazakhstan was to provide a brigade and become the second largest contributor.

It has so far been decided that each participating country will contribute a battalion each. This is due, on the one hand, to fears that big-time players, Russia and Kazakhstan, and perhaps Belarus later, might wield too much clout, and on the other, to the insufficient economic strength of the other members to allow them to contribute more.

Still, even such a limited force can deal with a number of situations - above all the suppression of terrorist and radical movements at short notice. A larger force is better fitted to fighting organized gangs or regular armies, but the CSTO is not yet facing such threats.

The rapid-response force is a major but so far only one of the first steps toward creating a powerful military political organization. The bloc's future progress will depend on the ability of its member-countries to address the global crisis - without a workable economy it is impossible to build modern armed forces. In this context, Russia appears to play a much greater role and remain the undoubted CSTO economic leader despite the crisis.

Russia's ability to stay economically sound and act as a powerhouse for its partners will be central to its claims to leadership among former Soviet republics and to the future role of the CSTO as one of the tools of that leadership.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

http://news.russiannewsroom.com/details.aspx?item=24629

Pentagon Papers II?

This major November, 2008 RAND Corporation study on intelligence operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, conducted 300 interviews at all levels with US, UK and Dutch intelligence officers and diplomats.

WIKILEAKS NOTABLE DOCUMENT RELEASE

The 318 page document could be described as part of the "Pentagon Papers" for Iraq and Afghanistan. It was confidentially prepared for the Pentagon's Joint Forces Command and focuses on intelligence and counterinsurgency operations.

The study's distribution was restricted to a select group of Coalition war partners and Israel.

It is a notable news and policy source, not for its arguments or conclusions, but rather for its wealth of candid and revealing interview quotes which are spread throughout the document, but especially in the 200 page appendix.

The material has been verified, and we ask readers to go through the document to extract key quotes for their communities. There are quotes on almost every aspect of the wars. The authors of the quotes, ranging from the UK Ambassador and the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency to on the ground intelligence officers, can be discovered via the footnote appendix.

Sample interview quotes:

The intelligence on the military side was not tied in with the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and the CIA was not listened to. . . . I had my most depressing discussions with the intelligence people who could see what this was leading to, and could see what the pop- ulation thought better than [then-director of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in Iraq L. Paul] Bremer could. . . . Between Bremer and [then secretary of state Donald H.] Rumsfeld, it had to be all talked up, which is the American way. . . . The discussion with Bremer was always on the optimistic side, while on the intelligence side it was much less so. And I think the same was true to an extent of [GEN John Philip Abizaid]. You don't succeed within the U.S. system unless you [display a can-do attitude].

In the military, . . . complex, divergent thinkers, either . . . bite their tongue or they get out.. . . Very, very rarely they get to be generals.

[A combined joint special-operations Task Force] snatched two brothers who were sons of a sheikh [with whom we have very good relations.] They did coordinate it, but did so poorly. They said, Were coming by to pick up this guy named whatever and used a name that was so common the task force couldnt know who it was. . . . Hes still in jail, and Im trying to deal with their father, and I havent been able to find [the son]. . . . These guys go in and blow down doors . . . when all they need to do is knock and theyll let them in. . . . They killed the son in a Christian family. . . . They said [that the son] was reaching for a gun. Yeah, okay, he shouldnt have done that, but these guys blew down the door, blew through the wall, and came with all their toys.

(Afghanistan) infrastructure manning those responsible for planning infrastructure recoverywas only 650 strong out of 16,000 people at [U.S. Central Command].

Dutch F-16s would go out and fly missions [in Afghanistan], and after the missions they would ask for the BDA [battle-damage assessments], which were classified Secret U.S. They could fly the mission and drop the ordnance, but they couldnt get the battle-damage assessment.

The military would look and say, Its stable, so lets go someplace else. Well, maybe its stable because of the footprint we have there. . . . There is a rush to determine a snapshot of the security situation in order to reduce the footprint. . . . Were seeing an increase in violence in [this city] because they continue to decrease the number of soldiers there. . . . [When we started pulling out] the Iraqis themselves said, We are not ready yet.

We also spent a lot of time, money, blood, and treasure on going after MVTs [medium- value targets] and HVTs . . . and I dont think it had a great deal of effect on the Taliban because they are not hierarchical. If we killed one guy, they just replaced him in about 10minutes. . . . [In that regard,] they are not that different [from] us.

I think that not interfering would be interfering with our mission. We dealt with training the police and then sent them out to the community. If they werent paid, then they were extorting money at roadblocks. As the police are seen as coming out of our gates, eventu- ally the extortion is going to reflect on us. The average Afghan citizen is not able to discern that it is Kabul that is at fault. . . . The Taliban is capitalizing on this very fact, because it is a regression to the situation like it was back before 1994. Police extortion is one way the Taliban is winning over the population.